कोर्ट ने वकील-पति को जज-पत्नी को भरण-पोषण का भुगतान करने का निर्देश दिया- जानिए पूरा मामला राजस्थान की राजधानी जयपुर शहर में, फैमिली कोर्ट नंबर 1 में एक असामान्य मामले की सुनवाई हुई, जहां एक महिला जज, जो आम तौर पर दूसरों के लिए निर्णय लेने के लिए जिम्मेदार होती हैं, ने फैमिली कोर्ट में शिकायत दर्ज कराई। यहां महिला जज ने एक सरकारी वकील द्वारा किए गए अन्याय के खिलाफ कोर्ट में शिकायत दर्ज कराई। दरअसल महिला जज और सरकारी वकील पति-पत्नी हैं। प्राप्त जानकारी के अनुसार वर्तमान में श्रीगंगानगर के श्रीकरनपुर में कार्यरत एडीजे इंदिरा बनेरा ने अपने बच्चों के पालन-पोषण की ओर से जयपुर स्थित कुटुंब न्यायालय क्रमांक 1 में याचिका दायर की थी।कोर्ट ने दोनों पक्षों को सुनने के बाद सरकारी वकील को बच्चों के अंतरिम भरण-पोषण के लिए हर महीने 24 हजार रुपये देने का निर्देश दिया है.दायर याचिका के अनुसार, इंदिरा बनेरा ने कहा कि उन्होंने 24 नवंबर, 2007 को भरत, जयपुर में अपने पति से अजमेर में शादी की थी। उनकी 2010 में एक बेटी और 2015 में एक बेटा हुआ। दोनों बच्चे इंदिरा और उनके पति भरत के साथ रहते हैं। कभी उनकी जिम्मेदारी नहीं ली। यह आरोप लगाया गया कि भरत और उसके परिवार ने बच्चों के साथ कभी अच्छा व्यवहार नहीं किया और न ही उनकी कोई देखभाल या चिंता दिखाई। भरत ने बच्चों की परवरिश की कोई जिम्मेदारी नहीं ली, इसलिए उन्होंने बच्चों के भरण-पोषण की मांग की।आरोप यह भी लगा कि शादी के समय भरत रोजगार की तलाश में था। उन्होंने उसे वित्तीय सहायता प्रदान की, जिससे वह अजमेर में सहायक परियोजना अधिकारी बन गया। इसके बाद भी उन्होंने कोई जिम्मेदारी नहीं ली।याचिका खारिज करने की मांगदूसरी ओर, विपक्षी पक्ष में पति के वकील डीएस शेखावत ने अदालत में तर्क दिया कि अकेले शिकायतकर्ता का वेतन 2 लाख रुपये से अधिक है, जबकि उसके पति का वेतन केवल 75,000 रुपये है। शिकायतकर्ता की पत्नी ने खुद तलाक की अर्जी दाखिल की थी। वह बच्चों की देखभाल करने में सक्षम है। इसलिए याचिका खारिज की जाए। कोर्ट का फैसला दोनों पक्षों को सुनने के बाद कोर्ट के पीठासीन अधिकारी अरुण कुमार दुबे ने पति को दोनों बच्चों के लिए 12 हजार रुपये मासिक भरण-पोषण भत्ता देने का आदेश दिया. इसके अतिरिक्त, अदालत ने उन्हें 20 दिसंबर, 2021 से रखरखाव राशि का भुगतान करने का निर्देश दिया।

Court Orders Airport and Indigo Airlines to Compensate Family After a Passenger Dies Due to Heart Attack The Kempegodwa International Airport (KIA) in Bengaluru and Indigo Airlines have been ordered to compensate a bereaved family after a passenger died of a heart attack at the International Airport.  The family members of the deceased person sued KIA and the airlines alleging that they failed to provide a wheelchair and medical assistance in a timely manner during the critical golden hour. A consumer court in the city ordered the KIA and IndiGo authorities to pay a total of Rs 12.1 lakh in compensation within 45 days of the order. The compensation includes Rs 12,00,000 to the complainants and Rs 10,000 towards their court expenses. The incident occurred in November 2021 when Chandra Shetty and his family arrived at the Bengaluru International Airport to travel to their hometown in Mangaluru. However, after the check-in process, Shetty collapsed on the floor, and despite his wife and daughter seeking help from the ground staff of Indigo and the airport team, they allegedly failed to provide a wheelchair to the ailing passenger. After 45 minutes, Shetty was taken to the hospital but passed away on the way. The aggrieved family later approached a KIA police station and filed a case against IndiGo and BIAL. When the case did not make any progress, the family approached the Bangalore Urban District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Shantinagar in March 2022. While the airport authorities denied the allegations in front of the consumer court, IndiGo did not file any response despite repeated notices. The BIAL submitted that the airport staff took the passenger to a clinic inside the terminal and then transported him in a buggy to Aster Hospital. However, the consumer court upheld the family’s allegations, observing that the airport staff’s approach was inhuman and stating that the airlines and the airport have a responsibility to provide a safe atmosphere and timely assistance to passengers in need.

Charge Not More than Rs 600 from Law Graduates for Enrolment as Advocate: SC  In a big relief to law graduates with limited family income, the Supreme Court Friday said state bar councils cannot charge them an enrolment fee more than Rs 600, as prescribed under the statutes. A bench of Chief Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice PS Narasimha issued notice to all state bar councils and sought to know from them how much they charge the law graduates by way of enrolment fees and how much money is collected in a year from them. The bench said as per the Advocates Act, the enrolment fee prescribed stands at Rs 600, and no state bar council can charge more than that. Senior advocate Manan Kumar Mishra, appearing for the Bar Council of India, said the Rs 600 fee for enrolment was fixed in 1993 and costs have risen manifold since then. The bench did not concur with Mishra, who also heads the BCI. “The amount prescribed in statute cannot be subject to inflation,” Mishra said while referring to monetary inflation. The bench said law is a service oriented profession and exorbitant fees cannot be charged as they may be detrimental to the interest of people coming from poor background. It asked Solicitor General Tushar Mehta to assist the court in the matter and posted it for further hearing after summer vacation. On April 10, the top court had sought the responses of the Bar Council of India (BCI) and others challenging the “exorbitant” fees being charged by state bar bodies for enrolling law graduates as advocates across the country. “We will issue notice on this. This is a significant issue. The petition says that the exorbitant enrolment fee violates Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961,” the bench had said. The petition claimed the enrolment fee in Odisha stood at Rs 41,100, and in Kerala at Rs 20,050.

दिल्ली हाईकोर्ट ने हाल ही में एक वकील को तीन बार अदालती कार्यवाही में बाधा डालने के बाद वर्चुअल कॉन्फ्रेंसिंग/हाइब्रिड मोड के माध्यम से अदालत में पेश होने से एक महीने के लिए रोक लगा दी। न्यायमूर्ति प्रतिभा एम सिंह की खंडपीठ ने कहा कि वकील जो अपने आवास से अदालत में पेश हो रहा था, वह वीडियो चालू कर रहा था और अदालत की मर्यादा को भंग कर रहा था।अदालत ने रजिस्ट्री और आईटी टीम को निर्देश दिया और विचाराधीन वकील को वीसी/हाइब्रिड मोड के माध्यम से किसी भी अदालती कार्यवाही में शामिल होने की अनुमति नहीं दी जानी चाहिए।मामलों की सुनवाई करते हुए, न्यायमूर्ति सिंह ने कहा कि वकील ने वीडियो चालू कर दिया था और उनका पूरा घर दिखाई दे रहा था। इसलिए, अदालत ने अदालत के कर्मचारियों को वकील को म्यूट करने और उसका वीडियो बंद करने का निर्देश दिया और कहा कि वकीलों को अदालत की मर्यादा बनाए रखनी चाहिए।अदालत ने अदालत के कर्मचारियों को वकील का नाम नोट करने का भी निर्देश दिया और कहा कि ऐसे वकीलों को वीसी पर पेश होने की अनुमति नहीं दी जानी चाहिए और उन्हें ब्लॉक कर दिया जाना चाहिए।

The Supreme Court on Friday upheld the dismissal of ISRO scientist for unauthorized absence and publication of paper without permission. The bench of Justices A.S. Bopanna and Hima Kohli was dealing with the appeal challenging the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court dismissing a writ petition preferred by appellant against an order passed by the Executive Council of Goa University (Disciplinary Authority) accepting the Report of the Standing Committee for Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Work Place and imposing upon him, a major penalty of dismissal from services and disqualification from the future employment under Rule 11(IX) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which was duly upheld by the Governor and the Chancellor of Goa University, being the Appellate Authority. In this case, The appellant commenced his career in the respondent no. 2 – Goa University as a Temporary Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, in 1996.  It is the appellant’s version, which is strongly refuted by the other side, that aggrieved by the passing of a resolution by the Departmental Council of the Department of Political Science against them, two girl students along with their friends submitted a complaint to the respondent no.2 – University, alleging physical harassment at his hands. The Committee served a notice on the appellant calling upon him to explain the charges levelled against him in nine complaints and to appear before it for a personal hearing on 24th April, 2009, a date that was subsequently changed to 27 April, 2009.  Contemporaneously, the Registrar of the respondent no. 2 – University directed the appellant to hand over charge and proceed on leave till the conclusion of the inquiry. The High Court observed that the Committee had granted ample opportunities to the appellant to cross-examine the complainants and the witnesses, but he had deliberately elected not to appear before it. In such circumstances, the Committee could not be blamed for proceeding ex-parte against him and submitting its Report.  It was also held that the Committee was justified in discarding the medical certificates submitted by the appellant as he kept on making flimsy excuses to stay away from the enquiry proceedings.  The issue for consideration before the bench was: Whether the order passed by the High Court needs interference or not?  The bench observed that Article 309 does not by itself provide for recruitment or conditions of service of Government servants, but confers this power on the appropriate legislature to make the laws and on the President and the Government of a State to make rules relating to these matters. The expression “conditions of service” in Article 309 takes in its sweep all those conditions that regulate holding of a post by a person which begins from the time he enters the service till his retirement and even post-retirement, in relation to matters like pension, pending disciplinary proceedings, etc. This expression also includes the right to dismiss such a person from service. Supreme Court stated that principles of natural justice that are reflected in Article 311, are not an empty incantation. They form the very bedrock of Article 14 and any violation of these principles tantamounts to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Denial of the principles of natural justice to a public servant can invalidate a decision taken on the ground that it is hit by the vice of arbitrariness and would result in depriving a public servant of equal protection of law. The bench referred to the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India where it was held that “The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14.” Supreme Court opined that to satisfy itself that no injustice has been meted out to the appellant, the High Court was required to examine the decision-making process and not just the final outcome. In other words, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority over the factual findings recorded in the departmental proceedings as long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings that cannot be faulted on account of procedural illegalities or irregularities that may have vitiated the process by which the decision was arrived at.  The bench stated that however salutary this enactment may be, it will never succeed in providing dignity and respect that women deserve at the workplace unless and until there is strict adherence to the enforcement regime and a proactive approach by all the State and non-State actors. If the working environment continues to remain hostile, insensitive and unresponsive to the needs of women employees, then the Act will remain an empty formality. If the authorities/managements/employers cannot assure them a safe and secure workplace, they will fear stepping out of their homes to make a dignified living and exploit their talent and skills to the hilt. It is, therefore, time for the Union Government and the State Governments to take affirmative action and make sure that the altruistic object behind enacting the PoSH Act is achieved in real terms. Supreme Court issued directions on implementation of Sexual Harrasment of women at Workplace Act: “To fulfil the promise that the PoSH Act holds out to working women all over the country, it is deemed appropriate to issue the following directions :  (i) The Union of India, all State Governments and Union Territories are directed to undertake a timebound exercise to verify as to whether all the concerned Ministries, Departments, Government organizations, authorities, Public Sector Undertakings, institutions, bodies, etc. have constituted ICCs/LCs/ICs, as the case may be and that the composition of the said Committees are strictly in terms of the provisions of the PoSH Act.  (ii) It shall be ensured that necessary information regarding the constitution and composition of the ICCs/LCs/ICs, details of the e-mail IDs and contact numbers of the designated person(s), the procedure prescribed for submitting an online complaint, as also the relevant rules, regulations and internal policies are made readily available on the website of the concerned Authority/Functionary/ Organisation/Institution/Body, as the case may be. The information furnished shall also be updated from time to time.  (iii) A similar exercise shall be undertaken by all the Statutory bodies of professionals at the Apex level and the State level (including those regulating doctors, lawyers, architects, chartered accountants, cost accountants, engineers, bankers and other professionals), by Universities, colleges, Training Centres and educational institutions and by government and private hospitals/nursing homes.  (iv) Immediate and effective steps shall be taken by the authorities/ managements/employers to familiarize members of the ICCs/LCs/ICs with their duties and the manner in which an inquiry ought to be conducted on receiving a complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace, from the point when the complaint is received, till the inquiry is finally concluded and the Report submitted. (v) The authorities/management/employers shall regularly conduct orientation programmes, workshops, seminars and awareness programmes to upskill members of the ICCs/LCs/ICs and to educate women employees and women’s groups about the provisions of the Act, the Rules and relevant regulations.  (vi) The National Legal Services Authority(NALSA) and the State Legal Services Authorities(SLSAs) shall develop modules to conduct workshops and organize awareness programmes to sensitize authorities/managements/employers, employees and adolescent groups with the provisions of the Act, which shall be included in their annual calendar.  (vii) The National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies shall include in their annual calendars, orientation programmes, seminars and workshops for capacity building of members of the ICCs/LCs/ICs established in the High Courts and District Courts and for drafting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to conduct an inquiry under the Act and Rules.  (viii) A copy of this judgment shall be transmitted to the Secretaries of all the Ministries, Government of India who shall ensure implementation of the directions by all the concerned Departments, Statutory Authorities, Institutions, Organisations etc. under the control of the respective Ministries. A copy of the judgment shall also be transmitted to the Chief Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories who shall ensure strict compliance of these directions by all the concerned Departments. It shall be the responsibility of the Secretaries of the Ministries, Government of India and the Chief Secretaries of every State/Union Territory to ensure implementation of the directions issued. 

Can Passport Renewal Be Refused on the Ground of Pendency of a Criminal Case? Answers Andhra Pradesh.HC Recently, The Andhra Pradesh HC answered an important issue that whether the renewal of a passport can be refused on the ground of pendency of a criminal case for trial in a criminal court. The bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari was dealing with the petition directing the action of respondents as arbitrary in refusing to renew the petitioner’s passport on the ground that FIR u/s 498 A of IPC and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was registered against the petitioner. In this case, The petitioner was issued a Passport to work in a private company in Kuwait and returned to India in 2011 and got married. Thereafter, he was issued a passport valid up to 21.04.2023. Since the validity of the passport is due to expire, he approached the concerned authorities in Kuwait for renewal of his passport. He was informed through a letter that he is an accused in FIR registered for the offences punishable under Section 498-A IPC and under Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act which was pending trial in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoti and hence he was not recommended for renewal of his passport. The issue for consideration before the bench was: Whether Section 6 applies also to the renewal of a passport? Whether renewal of the passport shall be refused on the ground of pendency of a criminal case for trial in a criminal court in India, in view of Section 6 (2) (f) of the Passport Act? Whether for renewal of passport the applicant against whom a criminal case is pending for trial in a criminal court in India, has to produce an order from the concerned court, in terms of the notification dated 25.08.1993, so as to be exempted from the operations of Section 6(2)(f) of the Act? The bench looked into Section 5 of the Passport Act, of 1967 and observed that on receipt of an application under Section 5(1), the Passport authority after making such enquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, shall, subject to the other provisions of the Act, by order in writing, issue the passport or travel document with endorsement, as per clauses (a) & (b) or shall refuse to issue the passport or travel document or as the case may be, refuse to make on the passport or travel document any endorsement as per clause (c). High Court noted that the Central Government by means of Notification, granted exemption from the operation of Section 6 (2) (f) of the Passports Act if such an applicant produces order from the Court concerned permitting him to depart from India. In other words, even if the proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant for the passport are pending before the criminal Court in India the passport authority shall not refuse to issue the passport if such applicant produces the order from the Court concerned permitting him to depart from India. The bench stated that “………………..there is no specific provision for renewal, in the Act. If it is to be considered that Sections 5, 6 (2) of the Passports Act do not apply to the renewal of a passport, then there would be no provision entitling the holder of the passport for its renewal. If renewal is not permitted, then the holder of the passport will have to apply for issue of the passport afresh. If that be the case, Sections 5 & 6 of the Act & Rule 5 with specified forms under the Rules shall again be applicable, consequently, there is no warrant for the view that Section 6 would not apply to an applicant for renewal of passport. In fact, from a combined reading of the Act, Sections 5 & 6 in particular, and the Rule-5 along with the contents of the Forms prescribed, the expression “issue” as used in Section 5 of the Act has been used not only for issuance of the passport for the first time, but also for its renewal………………” High Court observed that Section 6 (2) (f) would apply in the cases of those applicants and their applications for renewal of the passport shall be rejected. Whereas, those applicants for renewal of the passport in whose cases Section 6 (2) (f) is applicable but they are in India, if they produce an order from the concerned Court in terms of the notification, then their applications for renewal of the passport would not be rejected as they would avail the benefit of the exemption granted by the notification The bench opined that the applicants seeking renewal of the passport may be in India or maybe outside India, in order to get the renewal, where Section 6 (2) (f) applies, in view of the notification of the Central Government asking for submission of an order from the concerned Court where a criminal case is pending, on furnishing of such order from the Court concerned would be entitled to exemption from the applicability of Section 6 (2) (f) of the Act. In the end, the High Court stated that “………………….while considering the renewal of the passport, the passport authority would be within its jurisdiction and authority to refuse renewal, on the same grounds as in the cases of issuance of the passport for “the first time”, provided by Section 6 (2) of the Passport Act. In other words, Section 6 (2) of the Passport Act applies to the renewal of the passport, as well……………..” Further, the bench opined that in the cases for renewal, to which Section 6 (2) (f) of the Passports Act is attracted, i.e., where the applicant is facing criminal trial in a criminal Court in India, renewal of the passport shall be refused, subject to the fulfilment of the condition under the notification of the Central Government, dated 25.08.1993, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 22 of the Passports Act, upon which such applicant shall stand exempted from the operation of the provisions of Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 6. In view of the above, the High Court rejected the petition. Case Title: Kadar Valli Shaik v. The Union of India Bench: Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari Case No.: WRIT PETITION Nos. 1392 & 2896 of 2023 & 38869 of 2022 Counsel for the petitioner: Sri P. Sree Ramulu Naidu Counsel for the respondent: Sri G. Arun Showri

Case Title:-Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College & Ors. [SLP(C) No. 22337/2008] and other connected matters A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Wednesday reserved judgment on a batch of petitions challenging the validity of the All-India Bar Examination. The five-judge Bench comprised Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, A.S. Oka, Vikram Nath, and J.K. Maheshwari. The lead petition is an appeal by special leave preferred by the Bar Council of India against a 2008 decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a case dealing with the grant of affiliation and recognition to a law college. When the matter travelled to the apex court in appeal, a three-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice T.S. Thakur referred it to a Constitution Bench composed of five Judges for final determination of the "questions of considerable importance affecting the legal profession in general" that were raised before the apex court. It was during the pendency of this petition that the Bar Council of India, under the chairmanship of Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium, had decided to conduct an all-India bar exam for the first time in 2010. After more than six years since the referral, and more than 14 years since the High Court ruling, the Constitution Bench is set to finally lay the controversy to rest. Yesterday, the Court heard the submissions of the Attorney-General of India and Senior Advocate K.K. Venugopal and the amicus curiae, Senior Advocate K.V. Vishwanathan. They called into question the correctness of the law laid down in V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India & Anr. [(1999) 3 SCC 176] and pushed for a pre-enrolment examination. This argument seemed to find favour with the BCI Chairman, Manan Kumar Mishra, and Vice-Chairman, S. Prabakaran, who appeared on behalf of the statutory body. Picking up from where he had left off, Vishwanathan continued assailing the Supreme Court decision in V. Sudeer [(1999) 3 SCC 176]. He also questioned the soundness of the ruling in Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice v. Bar Council of India [(1995) 1 SCC 732], on which the Sudeer Bench had placed reliance. Vishwanathan claimed that by virtue of these decisions, the Bar Council of India had been placed in a subservient position vis-à-vis the state bar councils. He urged that the paramountcy of the Bar Council needed to be preserved in light of the objectives and purposes of the Act, and the organisational framework created under it. An issue that persistently troubled the Bench, and was pointed out by both Justices Kaul and Khanna, was the implications of the deletion of Clause (d) in Section 24(1) as a result of which, the requirement imposed on a law graduate to undergo a course of "training in law and pass an examination after such training" was removed. Vishwanathan repelled the contention that this would abridge the powers of the Bar Council of India, strenuously arguing that such power could be located in Section 49(1)(ag), which had been kept intact. Therefore, the BCI, Vishwanathan reiterated, was competent to frame rules with respect to the prerequisites for persons who were entitled to practice law. Justice Kaul mused – "We are a constitutional court. We could interpret the constitutional question and be done with it. But we have to try and make the system workable…There is no perfect world, in an imperfect world, we have to decide how to reduce the imperfections." The Bench highlighted a number of issues that followed from the proposal to conduct a pre-enrolment examination, including, inter alia, the impact of "hundreds of people enrolling on the same day" after the results of the pre-enrolment examination on seniority, the prerequisites for applying for the examination, the competence of a law graduate to work and receive emoluments in the "interregnum period", the difference in the academic calendars of different colleges, and the lack of uniformity of fee structures. Justice Kaul observed – "Say, pre-enrolment exams take place. We don't want another litigation on how it will work out. Can there be some thought process, some uniformity in it?" Several suggestions were floated by Vishwanathan, such as making students eligible to take the examination in their final year to prevent loss of time and conducting the examination biannually to accommodate differences in academic calendars. Mishra reminded the Court that their purpose was to determine the competence of the Bar Council to conduct qualifying examinations. Justice Kaul pithily remarked – "Your argument is basically that you are free to hold pre or post-enrolment exams as you deem fit. And that you should be allowed to do that." In the course of his submissions, Vishwanathan also relied on Satish Kumar Sharma v. Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh [(2001) 2 SCC 365] and Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh [(2011) 9 SCC 573], which he asserted, recognised the overarching powers of the Bar Council. After the amicus curiae concluded, the Court heard the submissions made on behalf of the Bar Council of India. Mishra, after delineating the spheres in which the state bar councils and the Bar Council of India operated, urged that the power to make rules to prescribe prerequisites were conferred by Section 49. The conditions laid down in Section 24 indicated the eligibility simpliciter, which could further be qualified by the Bar Council in the exercise of its powers of, inter alia, superintendence and control. The Court also heard the arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioners who endorsed the abolition of the post-enrolment bar examination. It was contended that the All India Bar Examination was unconstitutional and arbitrary. Advocate Kartik Seth, assailed the Bar Council on a number of counts, including the levy of an exorbitant fee for enrolment. Seth also reiterated Vishwanathan's recommendation of making final-year law students eligible to take the bar. Justice Kaul countered – "You have prepared well; you have done your homework. But we cannot take into consideration everything…This is a constitutional court. We cannot say charge Rs 3000 instead of Rs 3500. What you are giving, are suggestions. Let the Bar Council of India decide whether they would want to implement them."

In pursuance of the assurance given before the Supreme Court, the Bar Council of India today published its syllabus for the upcoming All India Bar Examination. The updated syllabus can be read on the website of Bar Council of India (http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/syllabus-for-all-india-bar-exam-xvii/). It may be noted that the syllabus for AIBE 17 remains unchanged when compared with the syllabus for AIBE 16.

Case Title : Raj Kumar Tulsyan Vs Savior Builders Pvt. Ltd. Noida Thr. its director Bench: Justice Abdul Moini Citation: RERA Appeal No. – 29 of 2022 The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow on Friday allowed the appeal filed against the decision of the RERA Tribunal and framed three important questions of law. A bench of Justice Abdul Moin was dealing with a case where the appellant had booked an apartment with the respondent promoter. As per the agreement reached between the appellant and the respondent, possession of the apartment was to be given by December 2015. When the respondent failed to deliver the possession, a complaint was lodged before the Authority in March 2018 praying for a refund of the amount paid by him to the appellant. The refund was claimed in view of Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, which provides for a refund of the amount and compensation. The Authority, while disposing of the complaint of the appellant by the impugned order, directed the respondent to give physical possession of the apartment by a particular date and pay the fine as per rules. The Real Estate Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed against the order of the RERA Authority on the grounds of maintainability of the complaint under section 31 and appeal under section 44 of the RERA Act 2016 against the unregistered project. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal had misinterpreted the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and held that unregistered projects do not come under the purview of the 2016 Act and that complaints and appeals against unregistered projects are considered non-maintainable. Against the decision and order of the Tribunal, RERA appeal was filed before the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court sitting at Lucknow, whereby the Hon'ble Court allowed the appeal and framed 3 important questions of law and stayed the order of the Tribunal. There were three important questions: Whether the finding of the learned Tribunal on appeal before the Appellate Authority against the non-maintenance and unregistered projects of the RERA Authority is based on misinterpretation of the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Newtech Promoters & Developers Pvt Ltd Vs State of U.P. ? Whether the finding of the learned Tribunal on appeal before the Appellate Authority against the non-maintenance and unregistered projects of the RERA Authority, is against the provisions contained in the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 and thus, is perverse and law Not sustainable? Whether the learned Tribunal erred in finding that neither the complaint before the RERA Authority nor the appeal before the Appellate Authority would be maintainable against the unregistered projects, as the real estate developers/promoters would be liable to a penalty for not getting their projects registered. Will use it as tool.? In view of the above, the High Court stayed the order of the Tribunal till the next date of hearing.

Title: Pundalik Yewatkar Vs Shubhangi Yewatkar Case No.: Family Court Appeal No.: 75/201 Recently, the Bombay High Court considered the question whether a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy without the consent of her husband can be termed as cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act? According to a bench of Justices Atul Chandurkar and Urmila Joshi-Phalke, a woman cannot be compelled to give birth to a child. In view of this, the appeal filed by the husband against the order of the Family Court is dismissed, allowing the petition of his wife for restoration of conjugal rights and the husband seeking divorce under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. dismissed the petition. In this case, the couple are teachers and the husband alleged that since their marriage in 2001, the wife insisted on working and also terminated her second pregnancy for the same, making her a victim of cruelty. He further claimed that the wife left her in-laws' house in 2004 and left him. The wife, on the other hand, claimed that she accepted motherhood as she had given birth to the first child. She further said that the second pregnancy was terminated as she was not well. She further claimed that the husband never tried to get her back nor did he pay any money for the child and his maintenance. Initially, the court claimed that neither party had added any evidence to support the claim regarding termination of the second pregnancy. Significantly, the court observed that even if the claims of the husband are taken at face value, the wife cannot be accused of being cruel merely because of her reproductive choice. According to the court, the allegations of the husband torturing him for a job by the wife are also vague. Considering thus, the bench dismissed the urgent appeal filed by the husband.

A sessions court in Mumbai has ordered a 52-year-old businessman from Ghatkopar to pay Rs 16,000 in monthly maintenance to his 47-year-old wife, who is an entrepreneur and earns Rs 30,000 every month, observing that the maintenance A woman cannot be denied a claim, simply because she is employed and her husband earns less than her. In this case the annual income of the husband is Rs 2.90 lakhs, while the annual income of the wife is around Rs 3.50 lakhs. After a magistrate's court ruled in favor of the wife, the husband filed a petition in the sessions court. The court ruled that the magistrate's observations in the order were reasonable and legal. “From above, the income of the husband appears to be less than that of the wife. A wife, on the other hand, is the responsibility of her husband. He is obliged to support her regardless of his earnings. As a result, the order does not require any interference” as per the Court of Session. The man claimed that the woman and her adult sons lived in a "posh" apartment for which he had paid rent of Rs 26,000 per month, living in a transit camp and using a public toilet. He also told the court that both his sons had done more than him. According to his lawyer, “The economic condition of the wife is stronger than that of the husband. In 2015, the wife abruptly left her husband for no apparent reason." On the other hand, the woman claimed that her husband earns at least Rs 1 lakh per month. The sessions court referred to a Supreme Court judgment which held that even if the wife is earning, she is entitled to maintenance determination. "Consequently, it is argued on behalf of the husband that his wife is a breadwinner and she is not entitled to maintenance," the court said. It was also noted that the husband currently had no liabilities other than his own expenses. “He also owns a business and other properties. Consequently, he is unquestionably entitled to the maintenance and payment of rent to the wife while the domestic violence application is pending” the court held. The woman had gone to the magistrate's court to file a complaint of domestic violence. In 2015, she divorced the accused and accused him of adultery. The husband denied the allegations. She claimed that he had sent her a notice requesting that he come back and have sex with her, but she refused. After that, the man filed for divorce. He rejected the woman's claims of maintenance.

Mumbai Court Grants a Woman Custody of Her 18-Month-Old Child, Citing the Importance Of ‘Mother’s Milk’ The Sessions Court of Mumbai has made an important decision concerning women’s rights. In which the sessions court upheld the lower court’s decision to place an 18-month-old child in the custody of his mother. According to the court’s decision, mother’s milk is critical for a child’s physical and mental development. Shrikant Y. Bhosle, a Sessions Court Judge, rendered this decision. The court denied the 37-year-old father custody of the child, stating that the child is one year and six months old and in desperate need of breastfeeding. Judge Shrikant Y Bhosale stated that the child has been in the custody of the husband for the past year and is not receiving mother’s milk, which is essential for her physical and mental development. As a result, the child should remain with his or her mother. In November 2021, she gave birth to a son The child’s parents, according to the information, had an arranged marriage in 2020. Following that, the woman filed a domestic violence complaint with the magistrate’s court in 2022. In November 2021, the woman gave birth to a son. She claimed that her husband and his family tortured her. He stated that he was evicted from the house on March 8, 2022.

Same Sex Marriage | Can Society Not Draw Few Red Lines to Say Thus Far & No Further? J Sai Deepak Argues in SC In a significant development in the ongoing proceedings before the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court regarding the recognition of same-sex marriage, Advocate J. Sai Deepak presented compelling arguments representing a women’s forum that opposes the batch of pleas seeking such recognition. His insightful remarks shed light on the nuanced legal and societal considerations at play. Addressing the Bench, J Sai Deepak began by highlighting the distinction between fetters and powers, asserting, “The central position effectively placed before my lords is with respect to the distinction between fetters and powers.” He emphasized the need to discern whether the matter at hand falls within prohibited areas or areas suitable for the court’s adjudication. This distinction forms the crux of the central issue in question. J Sai Deepak then delved into the question of legislative competence and its connection to the separation of powers. However, he further advanced the argument by focusing on the society’s right of agency in participating in discussions on changing heteronormative attitudes. He expressed, “This is not a question of separation of territories between different organs of the state but fundamentally hinges on the right of the agency of the society to participate in this particular discussion.” Stressing the importance of social conservatism, J Sai Deepak questioned whether the constitution allows for the society to draw certain red lines to limit the scope of societal change. He noted, “Does it mean society does not have the right to draw a few red lines to basically say thus far and no further? That is the central question.” As a representative of a women’s organization, Deepak argued against the individualization of marriage, stating, “The nature of the prayers raised in the petition has the consequence of ‘individualizing’ a socio-centric institution such as marriage.” He cautioned against undermining the social character of marriage and demeaning its significance by reducing it to a mere transaction between consenting individuals. Highlighting the issue of legislative prerogative,  J Sai Deepak pointed out the significance of Article 111 of the Constitution, which pertains to the President’s power to recommend amendments to legislation. He emphasized the need for societal participation and deliberation when addressing matters that aim to reshape the heteronormative attitudes embedded in legislations. J Sai Deepak further drew attention to the relevance of Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, noting its direct impact on personal laws. He argued that the debate surrounding the Act should involve the broader society, rather than being limited to those who adhere to the Act’s values. 

Case Title: Nand Kishor Gupta v. The State of Jharkhand Bench: Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi Citation: W.P.(Cr.) No. 425 of 2021 Lawyer Uses Enrolment Number of Another Lawyer in Filing Vakalatnama The Jharkhand HC on Wednesday observed that in filing the vakalatnama interpolation has been made by the counsel appearing for the petitioner. The bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi referred the matter to the Bar Council of India as well as the Jharkhand State Bar Council who will enquire into the matter. In this case, Mr. Rishi Chandan, who is a practising lawyer of Jharkhand HC pointed out that his senior is Mr. Rajiv Lochan and his Enrolment Number has been used in filing valalatnama. It was submitted that the spelling of the name of his senior is Rajiv Lochan whereas the spelling of this advocate is Rajeev Lochan. Mr. Jagdeesh, submitted that Rajeev Lochan who is arguing this matter sent vakalatnama in which Enrolment No. is 3325/2000 disclosed and he has filed the vakalatnama as it is he received. The entire document has been sent by Rajeev Lochan from Delhi. High Court observed that it appears that in filing this vakalatnama interpolation has been made by the counsel appearing for the petitioner namely, Rajeev Lochan. The bench referred the matter to the Bar Council of India as well as the Jharkhand State Bar Council who will enquire into the matter. High Court found that “This practice is looms large in the entire country. The concern has been shown by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as High Courts. In one of the matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed the Bar Council of India to find out fake lawyers and probably the Bar Council of India has taken certain steps pursuant to the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” In view of the above, High Court directed the Bar Council of India and Jharkhand State Bar Council to look into the matter and submit a report to the Court within four weeks. High Court listed the matter on 19.09.2022.

Sufficient Visitation Rights Must be Given to Parent Losing Child Custody to Maintain Social/Psychological Contact With Child: Karnataka HC The Karnataka High Court has issued a directive to a woman to comply with the settlement reached with her husband regarding the guardianship, custody, and visitation rights of their minor son. A division bench of Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde dismissed a habeas corpus petition lodged by the father to produce the minor son and instructed the mother to relinquish custody of the child to the petitioner during the summer vacation in accordance with their agreement. The court emphasized that while guardianship pertains to overseeing the welfare of a ward, child custody and visitation rights for a parent without custody must be provided to keep the child in contact with both parents, especially if they live in the same city. The court also instructed the father to take leave from work during the custody period and spend the entire period with the child, accompanied by the child’s grandmother and aunt. The couple married in 2011 but did not stay together beyond 2014 due to matrimonial issues. The wife then requested maintenance for herself and the child under Section 125 CrPC, which the husband opposed in the high court but reached a settlement with the wife. As part of the settlement, the wife was allocated as the child’s guardian, while the father was granted custody of the child during summer and winter holidays and visitation rights on weekends. Unfortunately, the petitioner-father was denied access to the child during one of the weekends in January 2023, and despite the start of summer vacation, the son’s custody was not handed over to him according to the terms of the compromise. The court determined that the petition was maintainable according to the findings of the case Yashita Sahu Vs State of Rajasthan, which held that if one parent has custody of the child, a writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable.

Case Title: Sunita et al. v. Vijay Pali Bench: Justice Swaran Kanta Sharma Citation: CRL. Rev. P. 161/2018 The Delhi High Court on Thursday held that, once a petition under section 125 CrPC has been pronounced, a subsequent petition cannot be entertained, arising out of the same dispute as the earlier one under section 125 CrPC. arising out of the issues already settled in the petition filed. A bench of Justice Swaran Kanta Sharma was considering the revision petition challenging the order passed by the Family Court, which had dismissed the maintenance application filed by the petitioner on the ground of Corres Judicata. In this case, the marriage was solemnized between Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.1. Since the time of the separation, the parties have been involved in several lawsuits. Out of which one such case was registered under section 125 of CrPC. The second petition was filed by the petitioner under section 125 of CrPC. To direct the respondent to pay Rs. 20,000/- per month in favor of the petitioner no. 1 and also to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- per month in favor of the petitioner no. The issue of consideration before the bench was: However, the said case was dismissed by judicial decision on the ground that before filing the said petition, the petitioner along with his two children filed a petition under section 125 of CrPC before the court of ACJM, Gurgaon, Haryana. Had it. Where once a favorable order has been passed on the merits u/s 125 Cr.P.C, can a subsequent petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C be filed? The bench observed that “a petition under section 125 of CrPC, by virtue of its universal applicability, shall be covered by the principle of justice. Once a petition has been adjudicated under section 125 of the CrPC, favorably by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits, a subsequent petition cannot be preferred which is a similar dispute having similar circumstances and grounds. as laid down in the petition filed earlier under section 125 CrPC. The High Court observed that the doctrine of res judicata evolved to prevent plurality of litigation in respect of a single issue and eliminates the issue of having a final adjudication ensuring finality in litigation. This ensures abuse of the process of law and deprives a litigant of access to the courts of repeatedly aggravating issues which have become final between the parties after the court of law has decided on the basis of merit. In view of the above, the High Court dismissed the petition.

Case Title: Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha Bench: Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia Citation: Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal)No. 2872 of 2022 Sec 143A NI Act | If Accused has Failed To Deposit Interim Compensation He Can’t Be Denied Right To Cross-Examination: Supreme Court The Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of the right to cross-examine the witnesses. The bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia stated that “if a statute prescribes a method or modality for the exercise of power, by necessary implication, the other methods of performance are not acceptable.” In this case, an order was passed by the Trial Court directing the Appellant to deposit 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation in terms of Section 143(A) of the Act within 60 days. The amount was not deposited by the Appellant. An application was made on behalf of the Appellant under Section 145(2) of the Act seeking permission to cross-examine the Respondent. The complaint Case was accepted by the Trial Court finding the Appellant guilty under Section 138 of the Act. The appellant court and Karnataka HC upheld the order passed by the trial court. Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, Counsel for the appellant submitted that in case the order of interim compensation as directed in terms of Section 143A of the Act is not complied with, the amount can be recovered in terms of Sub-Section 5 of said Section 143A as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Code, but it would not be within the competence of the court to deprive an accused of his right to cross-examine a witness. Mr. Anand Nuli, Counsel for the respondent submitted that orders passed by the courts below were consistent with the mandate of Section 143A and the right to cross-examine was rightly closed by the courts below. The issue for consideration before the bench was: Whether the accused can be denied the right to cross-examine if he has failed to deposit interim compensation? Supreme Court opined that the method and modality of recovery of interim compensation is clearly delineated by the Legislature. It is a well-known principle that if a statute prescribes a method or modality for the exercise of power, by necessary implication, the other methods of performance are not acceptable. The bench stated that “The concerned provision nowhere contemplates that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant. Any such order foreclosing the right would not be within the powers conferred upon the court and would, as a matter of fact, go well beyond the permissible exercise of power.” In view of the above, The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed to permit the Appellant to cross-examine the Respondent and then take the proceedings to a logical conclusion.

Case Title: Khema @ Khem Chandra Adi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Pamighanatam Sri Narasimha: Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 2022 of 1200 1202 The Supreme Court on Wednesday said that failure to examine independent witnesses leads to adverse findings against the prosecution. Justice B.R. Gavai and Pamighantham Sri Narasimha said that “though independent witnesses were available, the prosecution has failed to examine them. This is a matter in which the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt." In this case two daughters of the deceased Prakash were to be married. On the wedding day, all the accused started assaulting the deceased Prakash and threw him on the brick road. To save the life of the deceased Prakash's brother Inder (PW2), his sister and his wife came forward. An FIR was registered against the accused persons under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 506 of the IPC. The trial court convicted the appellants. The appellants filed an appeal before the High Court, which was also dismissed. The counsel for the appellants Shri Rajul Bhargava submitted that the prosecution has tried to suppress the actual origin of the incident. It was argued that though independent witnesses were available, the prosecution has failed to examine them and as such, an unfavorable inference needs to be drawn against the prosecution. State counsel Ms. Garima Prasad submitted that merely because (PW1) and (PW2) are relatives of the deceased, it cannot be a ground to reject their testimony. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Can the appellants be convicted under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 506 of the IPC? The Supreme Court observed that the lower court has also come to the conclusion that Omveer (PW1) Could not witness the incident. There is no doubt that Inder (PW2) is an injured witness and hence, his testimony cannot be taken lightly. The bench said that the testimony of Inder (PW2) would fall under the third category, i.e. his evidence can be said to be "neither wholly credible nor wholly unreliable". In such a situation it will be necessary that there is some confirmation in the testimony of his eyes. The Supreme Court said that the trial court and the high court have failed to consider the significant discrepancies and discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The bench said though independent witnesses were available, the prosecution has failed to examine them. This is a case in which the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt. In view of the above, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the High Court.

Bench: Justice R. Raghunandan Rao Citation: Writ Petition No.19480 of 2022 Recently, the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruled that the court can direct the police to issue a clearance certificate. Justice R. Raghunandan Rao was considering the petition filed for issuance of police clearance certificate and complaining that the inaction of the second respondent was high-handed, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In this case, the petitioner is working in Angola on the basis of his passport which is valid till 28.06.2028. The petitioner needs a police clearance certificate to renew his visa in Angola. Due to this requirement, the petitioner filed an application before the second respondent, which is the Regional Passport Officer, Visakhapatnam. Police NOC is not being given to the petitioner. The petitioner's wife had already filed a criminal complaint against him under sections 498-A, 323, 506 of the IPC read with section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that a police clearance certificate can always be issued by incorporating the details of the above offense. Non-presentation of such a clearance certificate will result in the authorities in Angola not renewing his visa and consequently, he will lose his employment in Angola. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the service of issuing of Police Clearance Certificate is a voluntary service rendered for the benefit of Indian citizens and there is no inherent duty on the other Respondent by virtue of any provision of law or judgment. Court, to issue such Police Clearance Certificate. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Whether Police Clearance Certificate can be issued to the petitioner or not? The bench observed that while the second respondent is issuing such certificates to the citizens residing abroad, the second respondent cannot take the stand that since it is a voluntary service, the second respondent is required to issue such certificates or There can be no instructions for non-issuance. In view of the above, the High Court directed the second respondent to issue police clearance certificate to the petitioner.

Twelve people have become HIV infected due to tattooing in Varanasi. According to the information, all these people have got tattoos recently. It is being said that these people have been infected with HIV due to the use of infected needles. A sensational case of 12 people getting HIV infected by getting tattoos has come to light in Varanasi. According to the information, 12 people in whom HIV has been confirmed include ten boys and two girls. There has been a sensation in the entire area as soon as the news of getting HIV infected by getting tattooed. All the infected were examined at Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital, out of which 12 people have been confirmed to have HIV. According to doctors, HIV infection has spread in all of them due to tattooing with the same needle. This information has been given by the doctors of Anti Retro Viral Treatment Center. According to doctors, all these people have got tattoos recently. All these people were feeling fever and weakness after getting the tattoo done. These people took medicine but did not get relief. After this, these people also felt that their weight was decreasing rapidly. When all these people got their blood tested in the hospital, it was confirmed that they were infected with HIV. It is learned that all these people got tattoos done from some fair. Some people often start getting tattoos done without understanding at the fair or street. Many times the tattoo makers do not change the needle due to the cost of the needle and make tattoos of many people with the same needle. If any one of them is infected with HIV, then everyone else will be infected with HIV using the same needle. These days the fashion of getting tattoos is going on among the youth. If you also want to get a tattoo or are thinking of getting a tattoo, then you should read this news carefully. Always keep in mind that whenever you go to get a tattoo, keep in mind that the tattooist should use a new needle.

Case Title: Shaukat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabil Shaukat & Ors. Division Bench: Justice Sanjay Dhar Citation: CRM (M) No. 238/2019 Recently, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court ruled that an adult son or daughter is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Central CrPC. A bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar was considering a petition challenging the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, which has dismissed the petitioner's application for quashing the maintenance order passed in favor of the respondents. In this case, at the relevant time the respondent was living with his mother, who was living separately from her husband, the petitioner. The petitioner retired from service and thereafter the defendants also attained the age of majority. The petitioner filed another application before the trial magistrate seeking quashing of the maintenance paid in favor of the defendants. The said application was rejected by the trial magistrate. Mr. Prince Hamza, counsel for the petitioner, submitted that, in terms of section 488 of J&K CrPC, only lawful or illegitimate minor children unable to maintain themselves are entitled to claim maintenance from their father. . It was submitted that the defendants having attained the age of majority are not entitled to claim maintenance from the petitioner from the date of their attainment of majority. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Whether an elder son is entitled to claim maintenance from his father under the provisions contained in section 488 of J&K CrPC. P.C.? The High Court said that a court has no power to add or subtract from a law which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a statute that becomes an obstacle to achieving the object and object of the statute, the court may give an objective interpretation of the statute, but where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is open to Not there. The Court reserves the right to add, replace or supply the words in the said statute and there shall be no need for interpretation. The bench said that an eldest son or daughter cannot be maintained by a magistrate in exercise of his powers under section 125 of the Central Penal Code. P. C/488 of Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P.C. But in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a prominent Hindu daughter on the basis of a joint reading of the provisions contained in section 125 of CrPC. PC and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. The High Court observed that “the defendants have, of course, attained the age of majority, as such, they are not entitled to claim maintenance from their fathers after attaining majority. The trial magistrate did not have jurisdiction to grant maintenance in favor of the defendants over the age of majority. Therefore, the order passed by the Trial Magistrate dismissing the petitioner's application for quashing the maintenance order, is without jurisdiction. , In view of the above, the bench allowed the petition and held that the respondent is entitled to maintenance from his father i.e. the petitioner only till he attains the age of majority.

The Bar Council of India (BCI) submitted before the Supreme Court on Tuesday that law graduates working in other professions do not need to resign from their jobs in order to be enrolled as lawyers, adding that such people will be given a six-month window to quit their jobs after passing the enrolment examination. The BCI’s general council made the decision on July 8 and conveyed it to the court in an affidavit filed last week, in a case where the Supreme Court is considering a slew of reforms to the enrolment process. The Supreme Court was hearing an appeal filed by BCI against a Gujarat high court decision in November 2020 that allowed a single mother to take the All India Bar Examination (AIBE) while continuing to work. According to the BCI rules, anyone who wishes to take the AIBE must first resign from their job and fill out the enrolment form. The Supreme Court, too, criticised the BCI’s regulations, suggesting on April 21 that a person taking the exam be allowed to resign within a certain time period after passing the AIBE. The BCI stated in its most recent affidavit, filed through advocate Durga Dutt, that “the Council has accepted the suggestions made by this Court and has resolved that every State Bar Council shall have three registers – A, B, and C.” It went on to say that ‘Register B’ will contain the names of candidates who are already employed somewhere and will be allowed to take the AIBE if they promise to leave their job within six months of passing the exam. The Certificate of Practice, which is required for any legal practitioner, will be issued only after such individuals have left their employment, according to the BCI. The other two categories in Register A and C did not concern the court because the first contained names of people who were not employed elsewhere; the third category will include people who were enrolled but later had their licence suspended in order to pursue other jobs or professions. Concerning the third category, the BCI stated that such individuals who have been in some other employment for five years or more since the announcement of the AIBE results will be required to retake the enrolment test if they decide to rejoin the legal profession. This rule, however, does not apply to people who stop practising but work in jobs related to the legal profession, such as public prosecutors, assistant public prosecutors, judicial service, or as law officers in corporate or government offices. The suggestion to provide separate categorisation of persons in employment who take the AIBE was made to the Supreme Court by amicus curiae and senior advocate KV Vishwanathan, who realised that the bar on taking up any other profession should apply only when practising law and not when taking the test. Vishwanathan told the Supreme Court that the BCI affidavit is largely acceptable, with minor changes suggested. The bench of justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, S Ravindra Bhat, and MM Sundresh took the affidavit on record and scheduled the matter for further consideration on September 27 to look into other aspects of the AIBE examination pattern and the conduct of surprise inspections of law colleges to ensure education standards are maintained. In this regard, the BCI stated in its affidavit that an agency to conduct the examination will be chosen by a committee led by a former Supreme Court judge. This committee will also look into the best way to assess the skill and knowledge of law graduates taking AIBE, focusing on their analytical thinking process rather than rote ability. This year’s AIBE cycle will take place in September and October.

Recently, The Supreme Court answered an important question that when accused can be discharged in a criminal case. The bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal was dealing with the appeal challenging the order passed by the Bombay High Court by which the Court has set aside the order passed by the court below vide which application filed by the Respondent nos.1 and 2 for discharge, was dismissed. In this case, The dispute arises out of an FIR registered for murder of Manmohan Singh Sukhdev Singh Virdi, a resident of Virdi’s Bungalow, Thombarewadi, Lonawala. His body was found lying in a pool of blood in his bedroom. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned order passed by the High Court shows that a mini-trial has been conducted merely by referring to some of the statements recorded by the police during the investigation, which were forming part of the charge sheet. This was beyond the scope of jurisdiction of the Court at the time of consideration of an application for discharge. The bench noted that at the stage of hearing on the charges entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed. In case no offence is made out then only an accused can be discharged. Truthfulness, sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced can be done only at the stage of trial. At the stage of charge, the Court has to satisfy that a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons. Interference of the Court at that stage is required only if there is strong reasons to hold that in case the trial is allowed to proceed, the same would amount to abuse of process of the Court. Supreme Court observed that the High Court vide impugned order had summed up the entire evidence in two paras without even referring to the Psychological Evaluation including Psychological Profiling, Polygraph Testing and Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature Profiling (BEOS) tests of the accused and the other aides of respondent no.1 and ordered discharge of Respondent Nos.1 and 2.

Case Title: Sanjeet Kumar and another v. Manjeet Kumar Bench: Justices Ritu Bahri and Ashok Kumar Verma Citation: FAO-3546-2021 (O&M) Punjab and Haryana HC Recently, the Punjab and Haryana HC ruled that one biological parent can give adoption to the step-parents out of which one of them can be a biological father or biological mother. The bench of Justices Ritu Bahri and Ashok Kumar Verma stated that “application for adoption of a child cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that a biological mother cannot become a mother in dual status i.e., a biological mother as well as an adoptive mother.” In this case, Manjeet Kumar (Respondent) was married to Renu (appellant No. 2) and a child was born. Later on, Manjeet Kumar and Renu got a divorce. Thereafter, Renu, solemnized her second marriage with Sanjeet Kumar (appellant No. 1). Both Sanjeet Kumar and Renu, filed an application under Section 56 of the Act read with Regulations 52(4) and 55(2) of the Adoption Regulations, for the adoption of a child, aged about 7 years daughter of Manjeet Kumar. High Court looked into the guidelines framed for the adoption of a child by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. As per, as per sub-clause (1) of Regulation 52, the couple which includes step-parents and one of the biological parents shall register in Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System with the required documents as mentioned in Schedule VI. High Court stated that “for all intents and purposes one biological parent can give adoption to the stepparents out of which one of them can be a biological father or biological mother. In the present case, all the required documents as per Schedule XX have been attached with the application and their application cannot be dismissed merely, on the ground that a biological mother cannot become a mother in dual status i.e., a biological mother as well as an adoptive mother.” High Court observed that as per Regulation 55, the definition of an adoptive parent has clearly been given in sub-clause (2) and Regulation 52 (1) includes the biological parent to be an adoptive parent. In view of the above, High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order.

Title: Akella Lalita versus Sri Konda Hanumantha Rao Case No.: CA 6325-6326/2015 The Supreme Court recently ruled that a relief for which no pleading or prayer has been made, should not be granted. As per the Bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Krishna Murari: it is a fact that absolutely no relief was ever sought by them for the change of surname of the child to that of first husband/ son of respondents. It is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice. This observation was made by the court while setting aside an Andhra Pradesh High Court judgement directing a mother to change the surname of her child and to reflect the new husband’s name as a stepfather. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, the main issue raised was whether the High Court was empowered to direct the appellant to change the surname of her child even though the respondent had sought no such relief before the trial court. At the outset, the Apex Court noted that it is well settled that if no reliefs are sought in the pleadings then it cannot be granted and if a court considers or grants such a relief for which no pleading or prayer was made depriving the respondent of the opportunity to resist the same then it would lead to miscarriage of justice. As per the bench, the High Court traversed beyond the pleadings by directing the change of surname of the child and therefore it set aside the impugned order thereby partly allowing the appeal. The court also reiterated that the mother, being the natural guardian of the child, has the right to decide the child’s surname and she also has the right to give up the child for adoption.

Prithvirajsinh Bhagirathsinh Jadeja v State of Gujarat and two others C/SCA/1672/2022 is the case no. The Gujarat High Court has reiterated that an advocate who does not appear and practice before the courts even when enrolled in the Bar Council cannot call himself an "advocate". As per the Advocates Act and the Bar Council Rules, if the conditions of employment do not require an advocate to plead and appear before the courts, a person cannot be referred to as an 'advocate' during this period of employment. as he is not practicing as a lawyer. The remarks were made during the hearing of two petitions in which petitioners desirous of the post of Joint Charitable Commissioner in the General State Service were declared ineligible due to lack of experience required as an advocate under the Recruitment Rules. The rules state that at least ten years of experience is required. The primary contention of the petitioners was that as per the rules the candidate should be enrolled under the Advocates Act 1961 for at least ten years, which the petitioners did. He didn't lose his nomination just because he was employed. His nomination continues even if he is employed as his name is not removed from the list but only suspended. The GPSC, on the other hand, relied heavily on the judgment of Deepak Agarwal v Keshav Kaushik et al. 2013 (5) SCC 277 to argue that an advocate essentially means someone who practices before the courts. If they are employed but not acting or practicing as per this definition, they are no longer 'advocates' as defined by the Advocates Act. As a result, the High Court concluded that "the continuance of his name in the list of the Bar Council has no bearing on his right to practice, and such person cannot nominate himself as an advocate." Taking these precedents into account, the High Court dismissed the petitions and refused to find fault with the GPSC's order.

Case Title: Raghavendra Singh & 3 Others Vs U.P. State. and other Division Bench: Justice Samir Jain Citation: Application u/s 482 No. – 2300 of 2016 The Allahabad High Court on Thursday quashed the criminal case registered on account of an alleged forged registered will. A bench of Justice Sameer Jain was considering the application filed under section 482 of CrPC. The complaint filed under sections 420, 468, 471, 506, 120B of IPC pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was to quash the case. In this case the complainant Raj Bahadur Singh, with the intention of usurping the property of the father-in-law of the opposition party No. 2, made a forged registered will of Vijay Bahadur Singh (father-in-law of the opposition party No. 2) in favor of his grandson, applicant no. 2 (daughter-in-law of Raj Bahadur Singh). ), carried out under the guardianship of. In the Registered Will, Applicant No. 3 and 4 were witnesses and Opponent Party No. 2 came to know about the Fake Will only when the process of transmutation began and when he requested Raj Bahadur Singh and the Applicants to quash the Fake Will. refused to cancel it. Counsel for the applicants submitted that, Opposite Party No. 2 filed a criminal complaint with malicious intent only to harass the applicants and the complaint does not disclose any criminal offense and for Opponent Party No. 2 before the Civil Court Effective remedy was available. Hence the complaint deserves to be dismissed. Counsel for the Respondents submitted that, merely on the ground of the fact that the dispute is civil in nature, the pending proceedings against the applicants cannot be quashed as the complaint dated 05.07.2011 also discloses prima facie cognizable offenses against the applicants. Therefore, the application deserves to be rejected. The High Court observed that there is no evidence on record on the basis of which it can be held that the said registered Will dated 30.11.2000 was forged. The bench observed that “Opposite Party No. 2 has given the color of a purely civil dispute to a criminal offense. According to the allegation, on the basis of the forged will, the proceedings of mutation were terminated in favor of the applicants, but there is no evidence that the will, the registered will, was forged, so only the competent civil court has jurisdiction over the matter could do. decide the issue of whether the will in dispute was forged or not, but the opposing party number 2 did not choose to file a suit to annul the will, therefore, it appears that he may have lost his score through criminal proceedings. as criminal proceedings can be initiated very easily and can also harass the applicants. , The High Court observed that whether a will is forged or not can only be ascertained through evidence and documents by a civil court of competent jurisdiction, but the opposite party No. 2 did not challenge the will before any civil court. Granted, therefore, the disputed complaint can be dismissed in court. Exercising jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. In view of the above, the High Court allowed the application and quashed the proceedings pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.

क्या चेक बाउंस नोटिस देने के 15 दिनों के भीतर एनआई एक्ट की धारा 138 के तहत शिकायत दर्ज की जा सकती है? सुप्रीम कोर्ट करेगा तय सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने मंगलवार को एक विशेष अनुमति याचिका में नोटिस जारी किया, जिसमें इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय की लखनऊ खंडपीठ के उस आदेश को चुनौती दी गई थी, जिसमें वैधानिक पंद्रह दिनों के नोटिस की समाप्ति से पहले निगोशिएबल इंस्ट्रूमेंट्स एक्ट की धारा 138 के तहत एक आपराधिक शिकायत को रद्द करने से इनकार कर दिया गया था। न्यायमूर्ति जे.के. माहेश्वरी और न्यायमूर्ति पी.एस. नरसिम्हा की बेंच ने नोटिस जाती करते हुए गिरफ्तारी के गैर-जमानती वारंट जारी करने पर रोक लगा दी और मामले को गर्मी की छुट्टी के बाद लगाने को कहा। अवकाशकालीन पीठ के समक्ष यह तर्क दिया गया कि लखनऊ खंडपीठ में इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने यह नोटिस करने में विफल रहा कि एनआई अधिनियम की धारा 138 के तहत दर्ज की गई शिकायत, उस तारीख से 15 दिन की समाप्ति से पहले दायर की गई है, जिस दिन दराज/आरोपी को नोटिस दिया गया था। कानून की नजर में शिकायत नहीं है और ऐसी शिकायत के आधार पर किसी अपराध का संज्ञान नहीं लिया जा सकता है। अपील में यह तर्क दिया गया है कि, निगोशिएबल इंस्ट्रूमेंट्स एक्ट की धारा 138 के तहत मामला दर्ज करने के लिए, ऐसे चेक के भुगतानकर्ता को प्रतिवादी (मूल शिकायतकर्ता) से उक्त नोटिस प्राप्त होने के पंद्रह दिनों के भीतर भुगतान करने में विफल होना चाहिए। और वर्तमान मामले में, याचिकाकर्ता को 9 जून, 2018 को एक नोटिस दिया गया था, शिकायत 21 जून, 2018 को दर्ज की गई थी, और याचिकाकर्ता के खिलाफ सिद्ध ऋण के खिलाफ कार्यवाही शुरू की गई थी। याचिकाकर्ता ने इस बात पर जोर दिया है कि शिकायत 24 जून, 2018 के बाद ही दर्ज की जा सकती थी, लेकिन पंद्रह दिन की अवधि समाप्त होने से पहले 21 जून, 2018 को दायर की गई थी। एसएलपी के अनुसार, “ट्रायल कोर्ट ने शिकायत के कानूनी और तथ्यात्मक पहलुओं पर विचार किए बिना गलत तरीके से वर्तमान याचिकाकर्ता के खिलाफ समन जारी किया और एनआई अधिनियम की धारा 138 की आवश्यकता को नजरअंदाज कर दिया। याचिकाकर्ता ने योगेंद्र प्रताप सिंह बनाम सावित्री पांडे के मामले का हवाला दिया, जिसकी रिपोर्ट (2014) 10 SCC 71 3 में दी गई थी, जिसमें सुप्रीम कोर्ट की तीन-न्यायाधीशों की बेंच ने फैसला सुनाया कि “एक शिकायत प्राप्ति की तारीख से 15 दिनों की समाप्ति से पहले दर्ज की गई धारा 138 के परंतुक के उपवाक्य (सी) के तहत जारी नोटिस कायम रखने योग्य नहीं है।”